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Abstract 
Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility, inflation targeting (IT) requires central banks 
to primarily focus on domestic inflation and to let their exchange rate float freely. This is 
consistent with the macroeconomic trilemma suggesting monetary independence, perfect capital 
mobility and a fixed exchange rate regime are mutually incompatible. However, some recent 
empirical evidence suggests that many developed and developing countries following an IT 
regime are reacting systematically both to deviations of inflation from its target and to exchange 
rates. I empirically examine whether the responsiveness of the interest rate to exchange rate 
fluctuations can be explained in terms of limited capital openness. Applying Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel estimation method for 22 IT countries, I find that short-term interest rates do 
respond to real exchange rate fluctuations. However, the responsiveness of the interest rate to the 
exchange rate declines significantly as capital market openness increases. The results indicate 
that capital controls have a significant impact on the exchange rate policy of the IT central banks, 
as the central banks have relatively less control over the exchange rate movements with greater 
openness of the capital market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since New Zealand adopted inflation targeting (IT) as a monetary policy framework, IT 
has attracted significant attention from both developed and developing countries. Under flexible 
inflation targeting, the monetary authority adjusts the short-term interest rate to stabilize 
deviations of inflation from target and the real economy, represented by the output-gap 
(Svensson (2000), Taylor (2001), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), Walsh (2009)). A voluminous 
literature that focused on developed countries suggests that inflation targeters let their exchange 
rate float freely (Taylor (2001), Svensson (2002)) with no controls on capital and often no 
interventions (Rose (2007)). However, recent empirical studies based on both developed and 
developing countries (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Edwards (2006), Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2007), Aizenman et al. (2008)) suggest that short-term interest rates react 
significantly to both inflation and exchange rates, implying that all of the IT countries do not 
follow a freely floating exchange rate regime. 
The idea of flexible inflation targeting regime is consistent with Mundell’s Macroeconomic 
Trilemma suggesting that the monetary authority has to choose any two of following three 
choices: 
 Autonomous monetary policy3  
 Fixed exchange rate 
 Perfect capital mobility 
Since the primary focus of the central banks in the IT countries is the stabilization of domestic 
inflation and the output-gap, the domestic short-term interest rate has to be adjusted independent 
of the foreign interest rate whenever the domestic inflation deviates from its target. As a result, 
the monetary authority has to choose between a fixed exchange rate and perfect capital mobility. 
Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility the optimal strategy for the central banks is to 
follow a flexible exchange rate regime. However, if we look at the average capital openness 
index for IT developed and developing countries (Chinn-Ito (2008))
4
 in Figure 1, we find both 
sets of countries do not allow for perfectly mobile capital flows across borders. After adoption of 
IT, countries have given up on the fixed exchange rate regime; yet some of them do not allow for 
perfect capital mobility. Therefore, in this paper I examine whether IT countries that are claiming 
to float are actually preventing large fluctuations in their currency value (also known as “fear of 
floating”); and if they are achieving this objective by imposing capital controls.  
(Figure 1 here) 
                                                             
3 such that domestic interest rate is independent of the foreign interest rate 
 
4 The index ranges from (-1.83) to 2.50, where higher values indicate a more financially open economy. The data are 
available for 181 countries from 1970-2008. 
 
Accordingly the purpose of this study is to answer the following questions: 
 Does the behavior of monetary policy in the sense of responsiveness of the interest rate to the 
exchange rate, vary with greater capital openness across developed and developing 
countries? 
 If the IT countries respond more to exchange rate changes in the presence of limited capital 
openness, are they successful in stabilizing both inflation and the exchange rate 
simultaneously? 
This study is important particularly in the current economic scenario. The advanced 
economies, for example US and Japan, are adopting quantitative easing, which is lowering the 
value of dollar and yen. This will make investors rush to other advanced and emerging 
economies in search of higher yields, which will lead to larger capital inflows in those 
economies. Instead of letting their exchange rate soar, many governments have intervened to buy 
foreign currency or imposed taxes on foreign capital flows. Brazil recently doubled a tax on 
foreign purchases of its domestic debt. Thailand has announced a new 15% withholding tax for 
foreign investors in its bonds. Therefore, it will be interesting to examine whether the presence 
of these capital controls might have any impact of the exchange rate policy of the central banks. 
In order to answer the aforementioned questions, I empirically examine a linear monetary 
policy reaction function
5
 where the short-term interest rate reacts to expected future inflation 
deviation, output-gap (deviation of actual output from trend output level) and real exchange rate 
fluctuations. To investigate the effect of capital openness on central bank’s exchange rate policy, 
I incorporate an interaction term between exchange rate and capital market openness and control 
for capital market openness to avoid omitted variables problem.  
The empirical results suggest that short-term interest rates in both advanced and developing 
IT countries react to real exchange rate fluctuations. However, the responsiveness of interest rate 
to exchange rate declines significantly as the capital openness increases. The results indicate that 
capital controls have a significant impact on the exchange rate policy in IT countries, suggesting 
that with liberalization of the capital account, a central bank with monetary independence loses 
its control over exchange rate fluctuations. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature on inflation 
targeting and exchange rate considerations. Section 3 presents the data, empirical methodology 
and discusses the findings. Section 4 assesses whether the IT countries have managed to stabilize 
inflation over the IT period, and section 5 concludes.  
  
                                                             
5 Derived from the minimization of a central bank’s quadratic loss function. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW: INFLATION TARGETING AND EXCHANGE RATE CONSIDERATIONS 
Empirical evidence by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Edwards (2006), Lubik and Schorfheide 
(2007), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), Aizenman et al. (2008) suggest that in some of the 
IT countries, monetary policy is responding systematically to both the inflation and exchange 
rates. Using a theoretical model, Parrado (2004) analyzes the impact of monetary policy in an 
inflation targeting small open economy characterized by imperfect competition and short-run 
price rigidity. He finds that depending on the shock that the economy faces, the effects of 
monetary policy on output and inflation volatility depend on the exchange rate regime and the 
inflation index being targeted. If the economy is hit by a real shock then the welfare loss 
associated with a flexible exchange rate is less than that under a managed exchange rate, and 
therefore, a flexible exchange rate is preferable. However, when the economy is hit by a nominal 
interest shock, the reverse is true.  
Further, in a structural general equilibrium model of a small economy using Bayesian method, 
Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) find that Australia and New Zealand do not include nominal 
exchange rate in their policy rule, whereas Canada and UK do. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
empirically test the data for 39 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Western 
Hemisphere from 1970 – 1999 and find that the countries claiming to allow for their exchange 
rates to float, mostly do not. They argue that the pass-through from exchange rate swings to 
inflation is far higher in emerging markets compared to developed economies. Therefore, the 
exchange rate has a greater potential to affect domestic inflation, which can impede the pursuit of 
an inflation target. This is one of the reasons why there is a tendency among emerging countries 
to cap exchange rate swings. Aizenman et al. (2008) suggest that among the IT countries, the 
commodity exporters are more vulnerable to terms of trade and real exchange rate disturbances. 
As a result, they react more to exchange rate changes compared to non-commodity exporters. 
Amato and Gerlach (2002) argue that financial markets are not well developed in the emerging 
markets and because of the lack of depth in the domestic capital market, firms, households and 
governments in these economies borrow in foreign currency. As a result, the exchange rate 
movements have severe impact on the borrower’s balance sheet. Therefore, the central bank may 
be required to increase the short-term interest rate sharply in response to a depreciation, which 
violates the precondition of exchange rate subordination under inflation targeting. They also 
argue that with the lack of track record of monetary stability, the exchange rate serves as a focal 
point for inflationary expectations. 
Xafa (2008) points out that IT countries have imposed capital controls to discourage capital 
flows and reduce appreciation pressure (Chile in 1991, Thailand in 2006, Colombia in 2007). 
However, there is little empirical evidence that controls are effective in stemming capital flows, 
especially over the longer term, as markets find ways around them. However, using high 
frequency data for Chile from 1991-1998, Edwards and Rigobon (2009) found that a tightening 
of capital controls resulted in a depreciation of the domestic currency in Chile.   
The literature on the impact of capital controls on the exchange rates is contradictory and 
lacks a panel data based approach. Further, although the literature to date offers explanations 
why the inflation targeting countries, especially the emerging markets react to exchange rate 
changes, the impact of capital market openness on the responsiveness of the interest rate to 
exchange rate movements is still relatively unexplored. Therefore, in this paper, I examine 
whether the inflation targeting countries are imposing capital controls to manage exchange rate 
movements while maintaining an independent monetary policy. 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
3.1 ESTIMATING EQUATION: 
In the inflation targeting countries, the short-term nominal interest rate is chosen as the monetary 
policy instrument. Here I assume a linear monetary policy reaction function where the target 
interest rate responds to expected future inflation deviation, output-gap and exchange rate 
deviations. 
                           
                                                                (1) 
where   is the CPI inflation rate,    is the inflation target,   is the output,   is the trend level of 
output,   is the real exchange rate and   is the trend level of real exchange rate.6 
Subsequently, following the conventional wisdom and the strong empirical evidence that the 
current interest rate (    depends not only on the target interest rate   , but also on the lagged 
interest rate (Goodfriend (1991), Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) and Woodford (1999)),    is assumed 
to be determined as follows: 
                                                                                                                    (2) 
where parameter      , represents the degree of interest rate smoothing,   is an exogenous 
random shock to the interest rate and it is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed (i.i.d).  
It should be noted that this view is notably challenged by Rudebusch (2002) who argues that 
the large and significant coefficient on the lagged interest rate is a result of some serially 
correlated variables that are incorrectly omitted from the reaction function. At the same time, 
most of the studies (Castelnuovo (2006), English et al. (2002), Gerlach-Kristen (2004)) 
investigating the relative importance of policy inertia and the omitted variables conclude that 
both mechanisms are at play.  
                                                             
6 The trend level of output and the trend level of exchange rate are assumed to be the implicit targets for actual 
output and exchange rate. 
Therefore, substituting (2) into (1) the monetary policy reaction function is specified as 
                                           
                                            
                 (3) 
To examine whether the central banks explicitly considers exchange rate in their policy rule, and 
to assess the effect of capital openness on the responsiveness of the interest rate to exchange rate 
fluctuations, I incorporate an interaction term between exchange rate deviations and capital 
openness and also control for foreign interest rate. To avoid omitted variable bias, I control for 
      as well: 
                                           
                                      
                                                        
                                                (4)                                               
where       represents the capital openness of country j at time t,    
  represents the foreign 
interest rate, and      denotes the disturbance term.  
3.2 DATA 
The macroeconomic data set used in this paper has been taken from IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics database and World Economic Outlook (WEO). The data set ranges from a 
time when a particular country started targeting inflation through 2009 at an annual frequency.
7
 
Data on the money market rate has been used as a proxy for short-term nominal interest rate 
(policy instrument of the central banks). The WEO one year ahead forecast of CPI inflation has 
been used as a proxy for expected future inflation for developing IT countries. However, since 
the forecast values for CPI inflation were unavailable for the advanced countries, an average of 
current and past CPI inflation has been used as a proxy for one-period-ahead expected inflation 
under the assumption of rational expectations. The output-gap is constructed by subtracting the 
trend level of real-GDP from actual real GDP where the trend real GDP is calculated using 
Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter 100). Similarly, the data for real exchange rate 
deviation is constructed by subtracting the trend real exchange rate (calculated using Hodrick-
Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100), from the actual real effective exchange rate. Here, 
an increase in the exchange rate is considered as a real depreciation of the domestic exchange 
rate. Further, I have used the normalized values (lies between 0 and 1)
8
 of Chinn-Ito (2008) 
index of capital openness as a measure of capital market openness, where the original index 
ranges from (-1.83) to 2.50, where higher values indicate a more financially open economy. 
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developing countries are available only at annual frequency. 
8 Subtract the minimum value from the actual and divide by the range to get the normalized values to transform 
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Moreover, the federal funds rate (interest rate of the United States) has been used as a proxy for 
the foreign interest rate. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the variables. 
(Table 1 here) 
Before estimating the equations I test for stationarity in the variables. For this I use 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests with a lag term, where the optimal lag length for each 
variable was selected using the Schwarz Criterion (SC). The null hypothesis (  ) for the 
stationarity tests is that the variable is non-stationary (has a unit root), and the alternative 
hypothesis (  ) suggests that the variable is stationary (with no unit root). The ADF test results 
are summarized in Table 2 and reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all of the variables, 
suggesting that they are all stationary.  
(Table 2 here) 
3.3 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
There are several challenges with the estimation of equation (3). First, since the focus of the 
study is on the period in which these countries have followed inflation targeting, the duration of 
study is not very long, giving a small number of observations for each country, which may lead 
to biased estimates. To address this shortcoming, I have used panel data set.
9
 Second, the 
equation suffers from endogeneity problem as some of the explanatory variables,           
  , 
        ,           and     depend on the dependent variable,   . Third, the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the estimating equation makes it a dynamic 
panel model. The second problem of endogeneity can be addressed by applying lagged 
endogenous variables as instruments. However, complications then arise as the lagged dependent 
variable would be correlated with the disturbance term. As a result, ordinary least squares, fixed 
effects and random effects models would generate biased estimates.  
To overcome this problem, I use a dynamic GMM panel data estimation model developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991)
10
 based on Anderson and Hsiao (1981), and Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). 
This approach involves taking the first difference of equation (3) to remove the individual 
effects. Moreover, the number of instrumental variables and hence the orthogonality conditions 
used to address the endogeneity problem, can be exceeding the number of regressors. Arellano 
and Bond’s dynamic panel data GMM estimator is appealing because it allows for more moment 
conditions than the number of parameters to estimate. They suggest combining all available 
lagged values of the dependent variable with current and lagged values of the differences of the 
exogenous variables into a large instrument matrix, making use of the moment conditions that 
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10 Difference GMM estimator. 
these instruments will be orthogonal to the disturbance term. The validity of the instrument 
matrix can be tested by a Sargan test. 
11
 
3.4 RESULTS FROM PANEL ESTIMATION 
In this section, I present the results from the Pooled OLS, fixed effects and Arellano Bond panel 
GMM estimations. The coefficient estimates of the panel regressions are summarized in Table 3. 
The coefficient estimates from the Pooled OLS and fixed effects suffer from endogeneity bias. 
The estimates from Arellano and Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation are more efficient for 
two reasons. This technique uses first difference of the estimating equation such that the 
presence of lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable does not generate coefficient 
estimates biased from an autocorrelation problem. Moreover, it creates an instrument matrix to 
address the problem of endogeneity. To examine the validity of the instruments, I apply Sargan 
test. The p-value of the Sargan test statistic (0.19) fails to reject the null hypothesis that “the 
instruments as a group are exogenous”, implying that the instruments are valid. 
(Table 3 here) 
The coefficient on the lagged nominal interest rate ( ) is significantly positive and greater 
than 0.3, suggesting moderate persistence in the interest rate for both advanced and developing 
economies. There are several plausible explanations in the literature for the positive and 
significant (but less than one) value of the coefficient attached to the lagged interest rate. The 
traditional explanation is that it reflects an “interest rate smoothing” or “monetary policy inertia” 
behavior by the central banks. Clarida et.al (1998, 2000) rationalize this slow adjustment on the 
ground that central banks seek to “smooth” interest rates, in the sense that they seek to minimize 
the variability of interest rate changes. Moreover, Goodfriend (1991) and Woodford (1999) 
interpret it in terms of policy “inertia” that helps the central banks to focus on the expectations of 
the agents in the economy on its stabilization goals (inflation and output-gap) when its actions 
affect the longer term interest rates as output and prices respond to variations in the long-term 
rates, and not to the fluctuations in the overnight rate. However, the long-term rates are to be 
determined by the market expectations of the future short rates, and therefore, a credible way to 
make an effective response to the inflationary pressures is committing to a changed future path 
of short rates. One way to do this is in terms of maintaining interest rates at a higher level for a 
period once they are raised or following initial small interest rate changes by further changes in 
the same direction. However, this argument is challenged by Rudebusch (2002) who argues that 
the large and statistically significant coefficient on the lagged interest rate is a result of mis-
specified representation of the monetary policy. He explains that the reason behind interest rate 
smoothing is that it reacts to some serially correlated variable(s) that is incorrectly omitted from 
the reaction function.  However, Castelnuovo (2006), English et al. (2002), Gerlach-Kristen 
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(2004) investigate the relative importance of policy inertia and the omitted variables and 
conclude there are both mechanisms at play. 
The coefficient on expected future inflation (  ) is also positive and significant, suggesting 
that in response to a rise in inflation, the central banks raise the nominal interest rate. The long 
run inflation coefficient is   , which is 
  
     
 = 1.04, implying that as the inflationary 
expectations increase by 1% over the target, the IT central bank raises the interest rate by more 
than 1%, such that the real interest rate rises. Further, as the actual output rises above the trend 
output level (making the output-gap > 0), the central bank increases nominal interest rate.  
Another interesting finding is that the interest rate responds positively and significantly to real 
exchange rate changes along with inflation and output-gap in IT countries. However, this 
responsiveness of the interest rate to exchange rate varies significantly with the degree of capital 
market openness. Here the responsiveness of the interest rate to real exchange rate is determined 
by the coefficient (           ). When the capital market is completely closed or     , 1% 
rise (depreciation) in the real exchange rate leads to 0.12% rise in the nominal interest rate. 
However, as the capital market opens up gradually, the reaction of the interest rate to exchange 
rate deviations declines significantly. Figure 2 displays the marginal effect of real exchange rate 
deviations on nominal interest rate along with the normalized capital market openness. The solid 
line in the middle denotes the effect of real exchange rate on the interest rate (           ), 
and the two dotted lines on both sides denote the 95% confidence interval. It shows that as the 
capital market openness increases the responsiveness of nominal interest rate to real exchange 
rate declines, but remains positive and significant until     0.89. As the capital market 
openness rises above 0.89, the dotted line below, crosses the 0 line, indicating that as capital 
market openness rises above 0.89, the responsiveness of the interest rate to exchange rate 
fluctuations becomes insignificant. This is in line with the trilemma suggesting that when the 
capital market openness is large enough, the central bank that has monetary independence, loses 
its control over the exchange rate fluctuations.  
(Figure 2 here) 
The coefficient on capital openness is negative and significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that greater capital openness, by itself, leads to lower interest rate.  Further, the 
coefficient estimate on the foreign interest rate (      is positive and statistically significant for 
both developed and developing countries. A positive     does not imply lack of monetary 
independence. It is possible that the countries are adjusting their policy instrument in the same 
direction in the face of similar macroeconomic shocks.  
4. STABILIZATION OF INFLATION UNDER INFLATION TARGETING 
In this section, I examine whether the IT countries are able to stabilize inflation and real 
exchange rate during their IT period. To examine this, I calculate the mean and volatility 
(reflected by standard deviation) of CPI inflation and real exchange rate of the IT advanced and 
IT developing countries and compare them with a set of non-IT developed and a set of non-IT 
developing countries respectively. For IT countries the data spans from the year of adoption of 
IT through 2009. For the developed countries the median year for adoption of IT is 1993, and for 
the developing countries the median year of adoption of IT is 2000. Therefore, for non-IT 
countries, the data ranges from the median year through 2009, that is for developed non-IT 
countries, the data spans from 1993 – 2009, and for the developing countries the data runs from 
2000 – 2009. The mean and the standard deviations of CPI inflation and the standard deviations 
of the exchange rates for the advanced IT and non-IT countries are summarized in Table 4. The 
mean and standard deviations of CPI inflation and the standard deviations of the exchange rates 
for the developing IT and non-IT countries are summarized in Table 5. The objective of the 
inflation targeting countries is to keep the inflation rate below 3%. Table 4 suggests that except 
for Iceland and Israel, the other IT advanced economies managed to keep their CPI inflation rate 
below 3% during their respective IT period. Further, the non-IT advanced economies managed to 
keep their inflation below 3% over the specified time period as well. The volatility of exchange 
rate is marginally greater in the IT advanced economies (8.4 on average) compared to the non-IT 
advanced economies (6.8 on average), suggesting relatively greater flexibility of exchange rates 
in IT advanced countries compared to the non-IT advanced countries.  
(Table 4 and Table 5 here) 
Table 5 presents the mean and the standard deviations of CPI inflation and the standard 
deviations of the exchange rates for the developing IT countries. The mean (around 5.5% on 
average) and volatility of the inflation in IT developing economies are very similar to non-IT 
developing economies except for Argentina and Ukraine.
12
 However, the volatility of exchange 
rates in IT developing countries (8.79 on average) is significantly greater than that in the non-IT 
developing countries (4.98 on average). This suggests that IT developing countries managed to 
stabilize inflation to around 5.5% level with greater flexibility of real exchange rates compared 
to non-IT developing countries. 
Therefore, to summarize this section, both IT developed and developing economies managed 
to stabilize inflation with greater flexibility of the real exchange rate compared to the Non-IT 
countries. 
                                                             
12 Both mean and volatility of inflation are greater in Argentina and Ukraine compared to other IT and non-IT 
developing countries. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Over time a growing number of emerging and developing economies are adopting inflation 
targeting, which requires the countries to primarily focus on domestic inflation stabilization and 
to let the exchange rate float freely. However, the recent empirical literature argues that some of 
these countries systematically react to both inflation and exchange rate deviations. Given this 
scenario, this paper sheds light on the question of whether these inflation targeting countries are 
using capital controls to systematically respond to exchange rate changes while targeting 
inflation applying Arellano Bond dynamic panel estimation methodology for 22 IT countries 
from the time of adoption of IT through 2009. 
There are three main findings of this paper. First, the empirical results suggest that the 
responsiveness of the short-term nominal interest rate to real exchange rate varies significantly 
with the degree of capital market openness. When the capital markets are completely closed, 1% 
real depreciation leads to a 0.12% rise in the interest rate. However, this responsiveness declines 
significantly with greater openness of the capital market. Second, when the capital market 
openness rises above 0.89 (as measured on a 0 and 1 scale by the Chinn-Ito index), the reaction 
of the interest rate to real exchange rate fluctuations becomes insignificant. Therefore, these 
findings support the macroeconomic trilemma, suggesting that when the capital market openness 
is large enough, the central bank that has monetary independence, loses its control over exchange 
rate fluctuations. However, with limited capital openness the central bank can achieve monetary 
independence and a managed float at the same time. 
Third, both IT developed and developing countries managed to stabilize inflation with greater 
flexibility of real exchange rate over their respective inflation targeting periods compared to non-
IT developed and developing economies respectively. Further, during their IT periods, both 
developed and developing IT countries experienced real exchange rate volatility of similar 
magnitude, which was greater than the exchange rate volatility in non-IT countries.  
For future research, one interesting extension would be to look separately at the effects of 
controls on capital inflows and outflows on the exchange rate policies of the IT central banks. 
Some recent literature (Edwards and Rigibon (2009), Ostry et al. (2010), Coelho and Gallaher 
(2010)) has suggested that controls on capital inflows versus capital outflows may have very 
different impact on real exchange rate volatility. It will be interesting to examine the implications 
of controls on capital inflows versus outflows on the inflation targeting countries’ exchange rate 
policies as well. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Nominal interest 
rate 
248 0.062 0.040 0.001 0.233 
Expected future 
CPI inflation 
248 0.034 0.018 0.0015 0.123 
Output Gap 236 -2.57e-11 0.020 -0.075 0.057 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
245 -0.002 0.071 -0.499 0.211 
Normalized 
capital openness 
228 0.792 0.291 0 1 
Federal Funds 
Rate 
248 0.032 0.019 0.002 0.08 
Table 2: Stationarity Test Results 
Variable ADF test statistic
13
 (# of lag selected by SC) 
Nominal interest rate 
(  ) 
-5.66*** (1) 
Expected future inflation deviation  
           
    
-5.56*** (1) 
Output-gap 
          
-12.18*** (1) 
Real effective exchange rate (REER) deviation 
           
-11.78*** (1) 
REER*Capital openness 
               
-10.08*** (2) 
Capital Openness 
     
-6.53*** (1) 
Federal funds rate 
  
   
-13.78*** (1) 
 
                                                             
13 *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
Table 3: Estimation results: All IT countries 
Dependent Variable: Nominal interest rate at time t, (     ) 
Variable Coefficient Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
Arellano-Bond 
Dynamic Panel 
Lagged nominal 
interest rate 
  
0.669*** 
(0.058) 
0.339*** 
(0.073) 
0.313*** 
(0.048) 
Expected future 
inflation deviation  
   
0.436*** 
(0.133) 
0.723*** 
(0.139) 
0.711*** 
(0.118) 
Output-gap    
0.271*** 
(0.086) 
0.161** 
(0.081) 
0.065* 
(0.039) 
Real effective exchange 
rate (REER) 
    
0.109*** 
(0.075) 
0.122*** 
(0.047) 
0.116*** 
(0.035) 
REER*Capital 
openness 
      
-0.102** 
(0.052) 
-0.113** 
(0.055) 
-0.098** 
(0.046) 
Normalized Capital 
Openness 
     
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
Federal funds rate      
0.196*** 
(0.072) 
0.274*** 
(0.062) 
0.280*** 
(0.052) 
Constant          
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.017* 
(0.010) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
Number of 
observations ( ) 
 210 210 170 
Number of countries  22 22 22 
     0.84 0.80  
Wald       298.27 
    -value for Sargan 
Statistic 
   0.19 
Robust Standard Errors in the parenthesis. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% 
level, * Significant at 10% level. 
Table 2: Mean and standard deviations of Inflation and exchange rate 
in Advanced Economies 
 
IT 
Developed 
Countries
14
 
Inflation 
Real 
Exchange 
rate 
Non-IT 
Developed 
Countries 
Inflation 
Exchange 
rate 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Deviation 
Australia 2.65 1.29 9.11 France 1.6 0.67 4.17 
Canada 2.02 1.12 10.51 Germany 1.74 0.94 6.01 
Iceland 6.36 3.70 11.93 Italy 2.71 1.15 4.51 
Israel 5.35 4.47 10.59 Japan 0.09 0.84 15.08 
Korea 3.29 1.65 10.75 Netherlands 2.17 0.77 3.96 
New 
Zealand 
2.40 1.31 8.42 
United 
States 
2.53 0.96 7.21 
Norway 1.98 1.07 2.58     
Sweden 1.52 1.34 7.49     
Switzerland 0.95 0.74 2.87     
United 
Kingdom 
2.56 0.94 9.28     
                                                             
14 For IT countries the data spans from the year of adoption of IT through 2009 and for developed non-IT countries, 
the data spans from 1993 – 2009, where 1993 is the median year of IT adoption in developed IT countries. 
Table 5: Mean and standard deviations of Inflation and exchange rate in Developing 
Economies 
IT 
Developing 
Countries
15
 
Inflation 
Exchange 
rate 
Non-IT 
Developing 
Countries 
Inflation 
Exchange 
rate 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Deviation 
Brazil 6.70 3.01 16.39 Argentina 8.59 7.71 4.50 
Chile 3.47 2.00 6.01 China 3.46 2.00 6.08 
Colombia 6.68 2.06 10.51 Croatia 3.17 1.38 5.42 
Czech 
Republic 
3.79 3.05 16.07 India 5.53 2.40 2.87 
Indonesia 9.27 2.91 6.49 Malaysia 2.19 1.45 3.71 
Mexico 4.74 0.84 7.88 Ukraine 13.17 8.38 7.34 
Peru 2.53 1.66 3.24     
Philippines 5.21 2.45 11.93     
Poland 4.56 3.51 9.08     
Romania 6.77 1.68 6.50     
South 
Africa 
6.12 2.85 8.79     
Thailand 2.45 1.95 6.59     
Turkey 8.99 1.99 4.80     
                                                             
15 For IT countries the data spans from the year of adoption of IT through 2009 and for developing non-IT countries, 
the data spans from 2000 – 2009, where 2000 is the median year of IT adoption in developing IT countries. 
 
Figure 1: Average capital openness in advanced and developing IT countries 
 
 
Figure 2: The Marginal Effect of Real Exchange Rate on Nominal Interest Rate and the 
Normalized Capital Market Openness 
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APPENDIX 1: IT COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY 
Table A1: Advanced Economies 
Country Year of IT adoption Period of estimation 
Australia 1993 1993-2009 
Canada 1991 1991-2009 
Iceland 2001 2001-2009 
Israel 1992 1992-2009 
Korea 1998 1998-2009 
New Zealand 1990 1990-2009 
Norway 2001 2001-2009 
Sweden 1993 1993-2009 
Switzerland 2000 2000-2009 
United Kingdom 1992 1992-2009 
Source: Central Banks’ websites. 
 
Table A2: Developing Economies: 
Country Year of IT adoption Period of estimation 
Brazil 1999 1999-2009 
Chile 1999 1999-2009 
Colombia 1999 1999-2009 
Czech Republic 1997 1997-2009 
Indonesia 2005 2005-2009 
Mexico 2001 2001-2009 
Peru 2002 2002-2009 
Philippines 2002 2002-2009 
Poland 1998 1998-2009 
Romania 2005 2005-2009 
South Africa 2000 2000-2009 
Thailand 2000 2000-2009 
Turkey 2006 2006-2009 
Source: Central Banks’ websites. 
 
